…As APC billboards get special guard in Kaduna

To guard against the destruction of campaign materials of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) in Kaduna State, security operatives were deployed to strategic roads, roundabouts and major routes leading to the Kaduna Township Stadium where the president Bola Ahmed Tinubu kicked off his 2027 campaign.

Officers of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Kaduna State Traffic Law Enforcement Authority (KASTLEA), the police and plain-clothes operatives were placed on 24-hour watch, particularly at night, ahead of the October 24, 2026 campaign flag-off. The operation was designed to prevent vandalism of billboards featuring President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Vice President Kashim Shettima and Governor Uba Sani.

The contrast captures Nigeria’s familiar election script: security agencies warn parties against violence, the electoral umpire urges compliance, officials promise offenders will face the law. The credibility depends on what happens after the meetings end.

On October 15, 2026, the Lagos State Police Command and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) brought political parties, security agencies, civil society groups and other stakeholders together ahead of the 2027 general election.

Commissioner of Police Fatai Tijani warned against deploying thugs to attack political opponents, disrupt rallies, intimidate voters or cause violence. Lagos Resident Electoral Commissioner, Abayomi Salami, also stressed the importance of peaceful political competition and credible elections.

The meeting was necessary, but its significance will be measured by whether the police, INEC and relevant state agencies enforce the rules consistently, including when allegations involve politically influential actors. That is the test facing Lagos as political mobilisation intensifies ahead of 2027.

From warnings to enforcement

The immediate concern surrounding the engagement was the alleged destruction of opposition posters and billboards and pressure on property owners to remove campaign materials. Complaints reportedly emerged from parts of Alimosho, Somolu, Kosofe and Ajao Estate.

These allegations warrant investigation, particularly where campaign materials were lawfully displayed and their removal was politically motivated. The police should establish the complaints received, investigate each incident and disclose the outcomes of cases where evidence supports prosecution.

The applicable law must also be identified correctly. The Electoral Act 2026 repealed the 2022 Act, so offences and penalties must be assessed under the current legislation and other applicable laws. The destruction of an ordinary campaign poster should not automatically be treated as an offence under a provision dealing with election materials.

For Tijani, the real test is whether the command can demonstrate progress through documented investigations, prosecutions and other lawful sanctions. Without such evidence, another warning risks becoming an annual ritual.

The economic cost of unequal political visibility

Electoral fairness extends beyond preventing violence to ensuring that political parties can communicate with voters. The cost of outdoor advertising, campaign offices and other publicity can give candidates with substantial financial resources an advantage over smaller parties.

Abia State illustrates the controversy. In July 2026, the state’s signage agency announced campaign advertising permit fees of N200 million for presidential candidates, N150 million for governorship candidates, N100 million for Senate candidates, N50 million for House of Representatives candidates and N20 million for state assembly candidates.

The charges raise questions about affordability and equal political access. Although governments can regulate outdoor advertising for planning, safety and environmental reasons, campaign-specific fees may become barriers to competition if they are disproportionate to legitimate regulatory costs.

Lagos has its own signage framework. The Lagos State Signage and Advertisement Agency’s published rate schedule sets annual permit fees according to billboard size and location. For a 48-sheet billboard, the listed fees range from N109,200 in a normal zone to N910,000 in an airport zone.

These figures are permit fees, not necessarily the full commercial cost of advertising space. Campaign expenditure may also include rental charges paid to media owners, printing, installation and maintenance. Assessing the financial burden on political parties therefore requires separating regulatory fees from commercial advertising costs.

Nevertheless, the broader question remains: can parties with modest resources obtain lawful advertising space and campaign offices without facing prohibitive costs or arbitrary administrative obstacles?

If smaller parties struggle to secure visibility while wealthier competitors dominate public spaces, formal equality under electoral law may coexist with substantial inequality in practice.

Claims that landlords have been pressured to deny offices to opposition parties also deserve scrutiny. Affected parties, tenancy records and landlords should be consulted to establish whether political intimidation has occurred. Similarly, allegations that opposition posters are removed while ruling-party materials remain untouched should be tested against documented complaints, dated photographs and permit records.

Why Lagos matters

INEC’s official report on the 2023 general elections recorded 7,060,195 registered voters, 245 Registration Areas and 13,325 polling units in Lagos. These historical figures demonstrate the scale of the state’s electoral administration, although the latest register should be consulted for current numbers.

Lagos is also Nigeria’s principal commercial centre. Electoral disruption can affect transport, retail activity, business operations and confidence in the stability of the operating environment. While these economic consequences should not be exaggerated, the cost of insecurity should not be ignored.

The police and INEC have complementary responsibilities. Section 214 of the Constitution provides for a national police force, while Section 4 of the Police Act 2020 sets out police functions, including crime prevention, apprehension of offenders and preservation of law and order. Section 95 of the Electoral Act 2026 addresses police security for political rallies and processions.

INEC’s constitutional mandate includes organising and supervising elections and maintaining the register of voters. The commission must ensure that its preparations translate into timely deployment of personnel and election materials, accessible voter services and transparent procedures for accreditation and result management.

It must also communicate contingency arrangements for the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). Technical problems should be handled transparently, with clear distinctions between voter accreditation, the recording of results at polling units, collation and electronic publication.

For the police, identifying electoral flashpoints is only the beginning. Officers must respond promptly to credible complaints, protect vulnerable communities and ensure that security deployments do not become instruments of partisan intimidation.

Lessons from 2023

The 2023 election remains an important reference point for assessing electoral security in Lagos. Allegations of voter intimidation, ethnic hostility and obstruction at polling centres generated public concern and undermined confidence among affected communities.

These claims should be assessed through election observer reports, verified footage, police records and judicial proceedings. They should neither be dismissed because they are politically inconvenient nor presented as established facts without evidence.

The controversy surrounding the Eze Ndigbo of Ajao Estate, who was arrested after comments about protecting his community, illustrates the need for careful scrutiny. His statements and the circumstances of his arrest should be examined alongside documented complaints of intimidation, the police response and the eventual legal outcome.

The wider lesson is that threats against voters require a credible response regardless of ethnicity, political affiliation or social status. Security agencies must investigate specific threats and evidence of wrongdoing rather than allow political disputes to escalate into ethnic confrontations.

A peaceful election is not merely one in which violence is contained. It is one in which voters can participate without intimidation, and parties can organise within the law.

Five tests for 2027

As preparations continue, five measurable tests will determine whether the latest assurances amount to more than rhetoric. First, accountability for violence. The police should investigate documented cases of political thuggery, intimidation and vandalism, publish credible enforcement updates and disclose the outcomes of completed cases. Impartiality matters more than the number of arrests announced.

Second, equal access to political visibility. LASAA and other relevant authorities should publish applicable charges, approval procedures and timelines. Parties must have accessible mechanisms to challenge inconsistent decisions.

Third, operational readiness. INEC should communicate its plans for voter registration, accreditation, election-material deployment, result management and technical contingencies. Preparedness must be demonstrated through operational capacity, not assurances alone. Fourth, protection of voters. Security deployments should reflect documented local risks, with officers protecting voters without favouring candidates or parties.

Fifth, public accountability. INEC, the police and signage regulators should provide channels for citizens and political parties to submit complaints, track responses and obtain information on enforcement outcomes.

The October 15 engagement provided an opportunity to establish expectations before political competition intensifies. But the credibility of the institutions involved will depend on whether those expectations are enforced consistently.

For a first-time voter in Alimosho, an opposition candidate seeking to display a lawful campaign poster, or a business owner pressured to take political sides, the question is not whether the authorities have read the riot act.

It is whether the law will protect them when it matters.

That is the standard by which Lagos’s electoral authorities should be judged in 2027.