Nigeria’s efforts to use digital technology to identify and track criminal suspects face persistent infrastructure and coordination challenges.
An evidence from Edo State highlights the risks of investing in surveillance systems without ensuring their long-term operation and maintenance.
An investigation by the International Centre for Investigative Reporting(ICIR) into Edo State’s Solomon Arase Command-and-Control Centre reveals the risks of surveillance investments losing their operational value.
Published in October 2026, the investigation reported that the centre’s emergency lines were inactive, several roadside cameras were missing or apparently non-functional, and state officials estimated that about N500 million would be needed to reactivate the facility.
While Kenya uses an integrated police command-and-control centre to coordinate emergency responses and surveillance in major cities, Rwanda has incorporated digital forensics, biometrics and CCTV into its policing operations.
South Africa has also deployed automatic number plate recognition technology to support vehicle intelligence and investigations.
The experiences of these countries offer lessons for Nigeria, where government assessments have identified limited surveillance coverage and gaps in command-and-control infrastructure.
In a statement published on October 6, 2025, the Ministry of Police Affairs said only Lagos, Edo, Oyo and Akwa Ibom had functional command-and-control centres. The statement, dated October 2, 2025, also identified inadequate drone deployment and limited surveillance coverage as constraints on the country’s security infrastructure.
The ministry’s assessment provides a dated picture of the situation at the time. It does not establish that the four states remain the only ones with functional centres in October 2026.
Developments in Edo State, however, illustrate a challenge that the existence of surveillance infrastructure does not guarantee that it will remain operational.
The investigation published by the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) on October 5, 2026, found that the Solomon Arase Command-and-Control Centre in Benin City had become non-functional less than three years after its commissioning in December 2023.
ICIR reported that the centre’s video walls were blank, emergency telephone lines were inactive and several cameras along major roads were missing or apparently non-functional.
The investigation also found that public records did not disclose the full cost of the facility’s wider CCTV network or its maintenance arrangements.
These findings raise questions about how governments fund, maintain and monitor technology-driven security projects after commissioning.
The centre was designed to bring representatives of security agencies together to monitor surveillance feeds, receive emergency reports and coordinate responses.
Its reported deterioration reveals how a system intended to improve response times can lose its operational value when equipment, communications and coordination arrangements are not sustained.
For Nigeria, the challenge extends beyond installing cameras. Surveillance footage is most useful when investigators can access it promptly, analyse it and connect relevant evidence to an investigation. Systems that generate alerts also require trained personnel and clear procedures for determining what action should follow.
Kenya’s approach to coordinated policing
Kenya offers an example of how surveillance and emergency response functions can be brought together within a police command structure.
The Kenya National Police Service’s 2023 annual report describes its Integrated Command, Control and Communication Centre, known as IC3, as responsible for coordinating emergency response, surveillance, critical operations and traffic management in Nairobi and Mombasa.
The report identifies an emergency call centre, a dispatching centre and a critical incident management suite among the facility’s components. These functions are intended to help police receive reports, coordinate operational resources and monitor public spaces.
However, the same report identifies inadequate maintenance of surveillance cameras as a challenge affecting the effectiveness of the system. It also notes that the Mombasa centre was only partially operational at the time.
The experience is not a case of a neighbouring country having solved the problem. It demonstrates both the operational value of integrated command systems and the importance of maintaining the infrastructure on which they depend.
For Nigeria, the relevant lesson is to connect existing state surveillance facilities with emergency dispatch, police operations and other authorised sources of intelligence, while ensuring that the systems remain functional.
Rwanda’s use of digital tools in policing
Rwanda has also incorporated information technology into its policing operations.
In an article published on May 12, 2016, the Rwanda National Police documented its use of CCTV, biometrics, facial recognition, crime mapping and digital forensics.
The police also described the deployment of INTERPOL’s I-24/7 communications system at border posts and the airport to facilitate information exchange with international law enforcement agencies.
The article said the police’s communications and information systems department included dedicated functions for information technology, technical support, communications, command and coordination, and cybersecurity.
The account provides evidence that Rwanda had integrated these technologies into aspects of policing by 2016. It does not establish the present scale of deployment or demonstrate that the country operates a single, nationwide system capable of automatically identifying and tracking every criminal suspect.
For Nigeria, Rwanda’s documented experience reveals the range of digital tools that can support investigations, from the analysis of electronic evidence to communication between law enforcement agencies. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the quality of the information available and the ability of investigators to use it lawfully and accurately.
South Africa’s vehicle intelligence systems
South Africa offers a more measurable example of how surveillance technology is being used in urban security operations.
In a statement published on September 1, 2026, the City of Cape Town said 530 enforcement vehicles were equipped with in-vehicle cameras incorporating automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) technology.
The city also reported that its Metro Police Strategic Surveillance Unit detected 41,005 incidents through CCTV during the 2025/26 period, resulting in 541 arrests.
The city said requests from the South African Police Service to view its surveillance footage had increased by 35 percent during the six months from January to June 2026 compared with the same period in 2025.
These figures illustrate the scale of surveillance activity in Cape Town and the use of digital footage as a potential investigative resource. They do not establish that every arrest resulted from ANPR or CCTV, or that the same results would necessarily follow from similar investments in Nigeria.
South Africa also has privately operated vehicle-intelligence platforms that share information with security organisations.
In a July 18, 2025 announcement, Vodacom Business said its partnership with the National Vehicle Intelligence Cloud (NAVIC) supported a platform that processed more than 120 million licence-plate image reads per month and stored about seven billion reads and associated metadata.
According to Vodacom, the cloud-based platform combines information from ANPR cameras with databases of vehicles of interest and other sources, including information from the South African Police Service. Alerts are processed through NAVIC’s alert room and national operations centre, which provide human oversight.
ANPR technology uses cameras and optical character recognition software to read vehicle registration plates and compare them with records of vehicles of interest. When a match is detected, the system can alert authorised personnel, who can investigate whether the vehicle is connected to a reported crime.
For Nigeria, where road transportation is relevant to investigations involving kidnapping, armed robbery and other organised crimes, the technology could help investigators identify vehicles associated with reported incidents and reconstruct their movements where sufficient camera coverage and reliable records exist.
Its effectiveness would depend on the accuracy of vehicle databases, camera placement, communications infrastructure and the ability of security agencies to verify alerts and respond.
Challenge of integration and accountability
The examples from Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa point to different ways technology can support policing. It can support through coordinating emergency responses, analysing digital evidence and identifying vehicles of interest.
This does not reveal that any of the three countries has eliminated the challenges of digital policing or operates a fully integrated system that can automatically track every suspect nationwide.
However, Nigeria’s immediate challenge is to establish the condition of its existing infrastructure and determine how effectively available systems are being used.
The Ministry of Police Affairs has identified the Nigeria Police Crime and Incident Database Centre, the West African Police Information System and INTERPOL’s I-24/7 as tools that can support identity verification, information exchange and investigations.
However, the existence of these systems does not by itself establish that they are fully connected to state surveillance networks, vehicle registration records, emergency services and other relevant databases.
A more effective security architecture would require reliable electricity and telecommunications, funding for equipment and software maintenance, trained personnel, clear procedures for sharing intelligence and coordination between federal and state agencies.
The Edo case also highlights the importance of public accountability. Governments need to disclose relevant procurement and maintenance arrangements, assess whether security facilities remain operational and explain how public investment translates into measurable improvements in service delivery.
There are privacy considerations as well because connecting surveillance footage with identity and vehicle records could strengthen investigations, but inaccurate matches and unauthorised access could expose innocent people to wrongful suspicion.
Any expansion should therefore include clear rules governing data access, retention, oversight and the use of automated identification technologies.
Nigeria’s digital policing gap is about sustaining infrastructure, connecting systems that need to exchange information and ensuring that officers can turn reliable intelligence into timely, lawful action.
Kenya’s command-and-control centre, Rwanda’s documented use of digital investigative tools and South Africa’s surveillance operations offer useful points of comparison.
Edo State’s experience provides an equally important warning that technology investments can lose their value when maintenance, funding and institutional continuity are neglected.
For Nigeria, the priority should be to verify the operational status of existing facilities, address maintenance failures, expand surveillance according to security needs and establish accountable arrangements for sharing information between authorised agencies.
The measure of progress should not be about the number of cameras installed, but whether digital infrastructure consistently helps investigators obtain evidence, respond to incidents and strengthen public safety.
Folake Balogun is a technology journalist covering Africa’s digital economy, with a focus on startups, fintechs, venture capital, artificial intelligence, and emerging technologies. Her work explores the intersection of technology, business, and society, highlighting how innovation is reshaping industries and everyday life across Africa and global markets. She translates complex trends into insightful and impactful stories for a wider audience.
