Nigeria’s greatest governance problem is not simply that its institutions are weak, but that the political incentives sustaining those weaknesses remain difficult to change. Corruption persists where public office provides access to resources without adequate scrutiny; patronage flourishes where political loyalty counts for more than competence; and public services deteriorate when officials face few consequences for failing to deliver. The country does not lack awareness of these failures. It lacks sufficiently effective mechanisms to make those who benefit from them change their behaviour.

This is why repeated declarations of national renewal have produced less progress than Nigerians need. Political leaders can condemn corruption while preserving the arrangements that make it profitable. Governments can promise better services without publishing reliable evidence of what their agencies have delivered. Citizens can express outrage at injustice yet defend misconduct when it benefits their preferred political, ethnic or religious group. The result is a cycle in which failure is widely recognised but insufficiently punished to prevent its recurrence.

The roots of this problem are partly historical, but history alone cannot explain its persistence. The 1914 amalgamation brought together territories with different political and administrative traditions under a colonial government whose priorities were not the creation of a cohesive democratic nation. Independent Nigeria inherited difficult questions about identity, representation and the distribution of power. But the choices made by successive governments have been just as consequential. Colonial rule shaped the state; post-independence leaders have repeatedly determined whether its weaknesses would be corrected or exploited.

That distinction between structural flaws and accumulated damage matters. Structural flaws arise from institutional design, the concentration of authority and the incentives governing political competition. Damage accumulates when corruption, exclusion, dishonesty and impunity become normal practices. An imperfect constitutional arrangement does not automatically produce a corrupt government, just as a difficult colonial inheritance does not make institutional failure inevitable. The damage deepens when those with the authority to reform the system discover that preserving its weaknesses serves their interests.

Political patronage helps explain why public anger so often fails to produce lasting change. Access to contracts, appointments and public resources can make political office valuable beyond its formal responsibilities. Weak oversight reduces the likelihood of consequences for misconduct, while selective enforcement allows political connections to become a form of protection. Under these conditions, appeals to patriotism and personal integrity are inadequate. Reform must change the incentives by making misconduct harder to conceal, public performance easier to verify, and abuse of office more likely to attract credible sanctions.

Public procurement is an obvious place to begin. Federal and state governments should publish accessible records of major contracts, including award values, contractors’ beneficial ownership, implementation schedules, variations and completion certificates. Independent verification should establish whether projects have been delivered at the agreed cost and quality. Audit findings involving suspected wrongdoing should receive documented responses within specified deadlines, with appropriate referrals where necessary. Governments should also publish the proportion of audit recommendations implemented and the value of unresolved questioned expenditure. Disclosure without investigation, correction or consequences is transparency in name only.

Electoral accountability is equally important. Where candidates consider ethnic loyalty, patronage and vote-buying more reliable routes to office than demonstrated competence, campaign promises become cheap and public performance secondary. The Independent National Electoral Commission must strengthen transparent electoral administration, while law-enforcement agencies and the courts should pursue electoral offences consistently and without political discrimination. Parties should publish costed programmes with clear priorities, delivery dates and measurable commitments. After elections, citizens and the media should be able to compare those commitments with actual results rather than relying on official claims of progress.

Indeed, responsibility cannot be placed on citizens alone. Selling votes, excusing misconduct by preferred candidates and treating public resources as the entitlement of one’s group weaken accountability. But poverty, insecurity, distrust of political promises and repeated experience of poor public services also shape these choices. Immediate rewards can appear more valuable than future benefits from institutions that have repeatedly disappointed people. Reducing vote-buying therefore requires enforcement and civic education but also credible evidence that elections can improve public services and economic opportunity. Citizens have a duty to scrutinise those in power; governments have a duty to make that scrutiny worthwhile.

The distribution of authority also needs attention. Excessive centralisation makes control of government especially valuable as a means of directing resources and rewarding political allies. Clearer responsibilities across federal, state and local governments, more transparent fiscal transfers and stronger local oversight could reduce opportunities for blame-shifting. Local authorities should publish their receipts, expenditure and project performance in accessible formats. State assemblies and other oversight bodies must scrutinise these records, while residents should be able to trace whether allocated funds produce completed projects and functioning services. Devolution, however, is not a solution by itself: without effective oversight, it can simply relocate patronage.

The test of reform must ultimately be public performance. Governments should report quarterly against a limited number of verifiable outcomes, including school attendance and learning, the availability of essential medicines, reliable water supply and infrastructure completion. Each target should have a baseline, a responsible agency and a deadline. Independent checks should verify reported progress; agencies that miss targets should explain why and publish corrective measures. Consequences must follow persistent failure, while recognising that officials also need adequate funding, staffing and operational authority to deliver.

None of these measures will work if telling the truth remains dangerous. Public servants and contractors who expose wrongdoing need confidential reporting channels, protection against retaliation and credible procedures for investigating complaints. Legislatures should track whether audit recommendations are implemented rather than merely receive reports. The media and civil society must retain the freedom to scrutinise public institutions without intimidation. Suppressing inconvenient evidence does more than silence critics: it deprives the government of information needed to correct mistakes and encourages others to remain silent.

Nigeria cannot rewrite its origins, but it can change the choices through which historical weaknesses are reproduced. National renewal will not come from declarations of unity or periodic campaigns against corruption. It will depend on whether public resources can be traced, misconduct attracts credible consequences, institutions deliver measurable results, and citizens can challenge failure without fear. The decisive question is not whether Nigerians know what is wrong. It is whether those who benefit from the present arrangements can be compelled to change them.